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SHOOTING HELLER IN THE FOOT?: APPLYING 
AND MISAPPLYING DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. 
HELLER’S “PRESUMPTIVELY LAWFUL” DICTA 
IN UNITED STATES V. SKOIEN 
Abstract: On July 13, 2010, an en banc panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit in the case of United States v. Skoien upheld 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), a federal ban on the possession of firearms by domes-
tic violence misdemeanants, against a Second Amendment challenge. In 
reaching its holding, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow either of two 
analytical frameworks that lower courts have applied to Second Amend-
ment challenges since the U.S. Supreme Court’s groundbreaking 2008 
ruling in District of Columbia v. Heller. This Comment argues that, although 
the Skoien en banc opinion ignores an important piece of the Heller 
Court’s dicta, its analysis is generally faithful to Heller and should serve as 
a model for other courts of appeals until the Supreme Court provides ad-
ditional guidance. 
Introduction 
 In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear 
arms in the home for self-defense.1 Heller triggered a salvo of litigation 
challenging federal firearms regulations on the grounds that those 
regulations violate the Second Amendment.2 Heller did not, however, 
adopt a standard of scrutiny or establish a framework for analyzing Se-
cond Amendment challenges, and lower courts have therefore had dif-
ficulty resolving those challenges.3 The clearest guidance Heller pro-
vided was enumerating, in dicta, a list of firearms regulations that are 
                                                                                                                      
1 See 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see also U.S. Const. amend. II. 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, No. 2:10-cr-00066, 2010 WL 3743842, at *3 (S.D. W. 
Va. Sept. 20, 2010). 
3 Jason T. Anderson, Note, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court 
Left Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 547, 547–48 (2009) 
(noting that Heller did not establish a standard of review); Andrew R. Gould, Comment, 
The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1535, 1550 (2009) (noting that Heller did not establish an analytical framework). 
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“presumptively lawful” under the Second Amendment.4 Heller did not 
explain why these regulations are presumptively lawful5 
 In 2010, in United States v. Skoien (Skoien II ), the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(9), a statute prohibiting domestic violence misdemeanants 
from owning firearms, against a Second Amendment challenge.6 This 
Comment examines how federal courts apply the Supreme Court’s pre-
sumptively lawful dicta in Heller to Second Amendment challenges to 
§ 922(g)(9), and evaluates whether the approaches comport with the 
Heller opinion.7 Part I identifies three approaches lower courts have tak-
en when interpreting the Heller dicta.8 Part II examines how each ap-
proach applies the Heller dicta.9 Part III evaluates whether lower courts 
are on target in applying the Heller Court’s dicta, or are instead shooting 
Heller in the foot.10 The Comment concludes that the Skoien II court’s 
approach is on target in applying Heller’s “longstanding” language, but 
misses the mark in applying Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language.11 
I. Three Approaches to Second Amendment Analysis After 
District of Columbia v. Heller 
A. District of Columbia v. Heller’s Lack of an Analytical Framework 
 In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held 
that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and 
bear arms in the home for self-defense.12 The Court held that two Dis-
trict of Columbia laws effectively banning handgun use would be un-
constitutional under any standard of scrutiny.13 The Court did not 
                                                                                                                      
 
4 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt 
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, 
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and govern-
ment buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.”); see id. at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures 
only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”); Gould, supra note 3, at 
1550. 
5 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
6 United States v. Skoien (Skoien II ), 614 F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
7 See infra notes 12–106 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 12–53 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 54–86 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 87–106 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 96–106 and accompanying text. 
12 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see also U.S. Const. amend. II. 
13 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75, 628–29, 635. The Court struck down one law banning 
handgun possession in the home, and another requiring that arms kept in the home must 
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adopt a standard of review or establish a framework for analyzing Sec-
ond Amendment challenges, but ruled out rational basis scrutiny or an 
interest-balancing test.14 In dicta, the Court provided a nonexhaustive 
list of “longstanding” regulations that are “presumptively lawful” under 
the Second Amendment,15 including 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) which bans 
felons from owning firearms.16 The Court did not explain what it 
meant by “longstanding” or “presumptively lawful,” or why these attrib-
utes made the laws constitutional.17 
 Lower courts considering Second Amendment challenges to 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g) have had trouble divining an analytical framework 
from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Heller,18 and generally turn to the 
Court’s “presumptively lawful” dicta for guidance.19 Courts have taken 
three approaches when applying the Heller Court’s dicta:20 the analogy 
or “safe harbor” approach, the independent justification approach, and 
the unique Seventh Circuit en banc majority approach.21 
                                                                                                                      
 
be locked. Id. The Court did not address the constitutionality of a third law that required 
handguns to be licensed. Id. at 630–31. 
14 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (rejecting rational basis), 634–35 (rejecting interest bal-
ancing). 
15 Id. at 626–27, 627 n.26 (calling the felon ban a “presumptively lawful regulatory 
measure[]” and noting that the presumptively lawful list “does not purport to be exhaus-
tive”). 
16 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) (banning felons from owning firearms); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3559(a) (2006) (defining a federal felony as an offense punishable by more than a year 
in prison); Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26. 
17 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 628 n.27; Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1551, 1564 (2009) (“The Court didn’t give any substantive explanation for why the 
types of laws mentioned in the [presumptively lawful] list were constitutional aside from a 
description of them as ‘longstanding.’”). 
18 See Calvin Massey, Second Amendment Decision Rules, 60 Hastings L.J. 1431, 1431 
(2009) (noting that the Heller Court “offered little guidance concerning [Second Amend-
ment] decision rules”); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the 
Lower Courts, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 2035, 2042 (2008) (calling Heller “reticen[t]” concerning 
a standard of review); Winkler, supra note 17, at 1567 (noting that the presumptively lawful 
list is “offered up . . . without any reasoning or explanation”); Anderson, supra note 3, at 
547–48 (noting that the Heller majority did not identify what standard it was using). 
19 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008) (citing Hel-
ler, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17) (calling the standard of scrutiny issue a “complex and unan-
swered question” and instead analyzing a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) by comparing 
that provision to the presumptively lawful list); see also Winkler, supra note 17, at 1566–67 
(noting, in 2009, that nearly every Second Amendment challenge had been decided on 
the basis of Heller’s dicta). 
20 See infra notes 22–53 and accompanying text. 
21 See United States v. Chester (Chester I ), 367 F. App’x 392, 396 (4th Cir.) (per cu-
riam), vacated, 628 F.3d 673 (2010) (noting that, when Chester I was decided, courts had 
employed two approaches to Second Amendment challenges); see also United States v. 
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B. Three Approaches to Interpreting the Dicta in Heller 
1. Approach One: Analogy to the Heller Court’s “Presumptively Lawful” 
Dicta 
 A majority of published lower court decisions have determined the 
constitutionality of § 922(g)(9) by comparing that section to the fire-
arms laws that Heller called “presumptively lawful”22—the “analogy” or 
“safe harbor” approach.23 
 The 2010 opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit in United States v. White exemplifies the analogy approach.24 In 
White, the court upheld § 922(g)(9) on the grounds that it applies only 
to violent offenders and is therefore narrower than the presumptively 
lawful § 922(g)(1), which bans firearm possession for both violent and 
nonviolent offenders.25 Because Congress designed § 922(g)(9) spe-
cifically to prevent violent offenders from owning guns, and that provi-
sion is more narrow than the general felon ban in § 922(g)(1), the 
Eleventh Circuit saw “no reason to exclude § 922(g)(9)” from the Heller 
list of presumptively lawful regulations.26 The White panel addressed 
Heller’s “longstanding” prong by explaining that it was upholding 
§ 922(g)(9) even though that section was passed “relatively recently.”27 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld § 922(g)(9) 
without discussion in an unpublished order.28 
                                                                                                                     
2. Approach Two: “Independent Justification” 
 A three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Skoien 
(Skoien I) rejected the analogy approach, holding that each federal fire-
 
Skoien (Skoien II ), 614 F.3d 638, 639–42, 645 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (employing a 
unique approach). 
22 See United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing In re 
United States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009)); United States v. Wyman, No. CR-08–
154-B-W, 2009 WL 426293, at *1 (D. Me. Feb. 20, 2009); United States v. Li, No. 08-CR-212, 
2008 WL 4610318, at *4–5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2008); Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 163–64; see 
also Winkler, supra note 17, at 1566–67 (noting that courts decide challenges to all provi-
sions of § 922(g), not only § 922(g)(9), by analogy to the Heller dicta). 
23 The labels for this approach derive from the fact that courts employing it either rea-
son by analogy, or simply treat the Heller list as a “safe harbor” for similar laws. See Chester II, 
628 F.3d at 679. 
24 593 F.3d at 1205–06. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1206. 
27 Id. 
28 See In re United States, 578 F.3d at 1195. 
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arms law must be independently justified under a heightened level of 
scrutiny.29 Steven Skoien was convicted of misdemeanor domestic bat-
tery in 2006 and was prohibited from possessing firearms under 
§ 922(g)(9).30 Probation agents found a shotgun in Skoien’s pickup 
truck in 2007 and a grand jury indicted him for possessing a firearm 
after conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, in viola-
tion of § 922(g)(9).31 
 Skoien argued that applying § 922(g)(9) to him violated his Sec-
ond Amendment rights.32 The district judge interpreted the Heller dicta 
to mean that persons forfeit their Second Amendment rights when 
they commit serious crimes and held that § 922(g)(9) was constitu-
tional under even the highest standard of scrutiny.33 
 Skoien appealed to the Seventh Circuit.34 The Seventh Circuit 
panel refused to apply the analogy approach,35 opining that it would be 
a mistake to uphold a gun law by comparison to the Heller dicta.36 In-
stead, the panel concluded that gun laws (apart from complete bans 
like the one in Heller) must be “independently justified.”37 
 The three-judge panel proposed a two-step inquiry for determin-
ing whether a firearms regulation is independently justified.38 First, 
trial courts should determine whether the regulated conduct (here, 
owning a gun after a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction) is 
                                                                                                                      
29 See United States v. Skoien (Skoien I ), 587 F.3d 803, 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, 
No. 08-3770, 2010 WL 1267262 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010). 
30 Id. at 806. The terms of Skoien’s probation also prohibited him from owning a gun. Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 806–07. This disposition does not fall into any of the three approaches that 
this Comment identifies, though it comports with a strand of analysis identified by the 
three-judge panel in Skoien I. See supra notes 22–32 and accompanying text; infra notes 34–
53 and accompanying text. Although Heller did not explain why the presumptively lawful 
regulations are constitutional, the Skoien I panel identified two rationales. See 587 F.3d at 
808. First, the laws could be constitutional because certain persons forfeit their Second 
Amendment rights altogether—for example, serious criminals or the mentally ill. See id. 
Under this rationale, the individual does not enjoy Second Amendment rights at all and 
any regulation on his ownership of firearms would be constitutional. See id. The second 
rationale is that, if the Second Amendment does protect the individual’s rights, a law is 
constitutional if it passes a heightened level of scrutiny. See id. This distinction may become 
important as Second Amendment doctrine continues to develop, but this Comment does 
not directly address it. 
34 587 F.3d at 807. 
35 Id. at 808. 
36 Id. Courts employing the analogy approach do uphold § 922(g)(9) by comparing it to 
the Heller list. See Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 163–65; supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text. 
37 Skoien I, 587 F.3d at 808. 
38 Id. at 808–09. 
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protected by the Second Amendment as it was “publicly understood 
when the Bill of Rights was ratified.”39 Second, if the law regulates con-
duct that falls within the scope of the Amendment, the court must ap-
ply the proper level of means-ends scrutiny.40 The panel determined 
that intermediate scrutiny should apply to Skoien’s challenge,41 vacated 
Skoien’s conviction, and remanded to allow the government to prove 
its burden under intermediate scrutiny.42 The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit adopted the independent justification approach 
in United States v. Chester in 2010.43 
                                                                                                                     
3. Approach Three: The Skoien En Banc Analysis 
 The Seventh Circuit reheard Skoien’s case en banc in 2010 and 
affirmed the trial court decision.44 The Skoien II court borrowed from 
the analogy and independent justification approaches in applying the 
Heller dicta.45 First, the court borrowed the historical prong of the in-
dependent justification analysis46 and held that the Second Amend-
ment, as historically understood, barred certain criminals from owning 
firearms.47 Second, the Skoien II court turned to Heller’s “longstanding” 
and “presumptively lawful” language, concluding that Heller does not 
foreclose § 922(g)(9)’s constitutionality.48 The court borrowed the log-
ic of the analogy approach to interpret “presumptively lawful,” reason-
ing that § 922(g)(9) is more narrow than the “presumptively lawful” 
 
39 Id. This historical prong, designed to capture the Second Amendment’s meaning at 
the time it was ratified, attempts to pay homage to the Heller Court’s historical and textual 
analysis of the Second Amendment. See Chester II, 628 F.3d at 678–79. If the government 
establishes that the Second Amendment does not protect the regulated conduct, the 
court’s inquiry ends and the law is constitutional. Id. 
40 Skoien I, 587 F.3d at 809. 
41 Id. at 812. 
42 Id. at 806, 815. The panel determined that the government had not carried its bur-
den under intermediate scrutiny, but remanded because the government had no way of 
knowing that it would be required to pass intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 815. 
43 See Chester II, 628 F.3d at 680 (“Thus, a two-part approach to Second Amendment 
claims seems appropriate under Heller, as explained by . . . Judge Sykes in the now-vacated 
[Skoien I] panel opinion . . . .”). 
44 Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 639–40, 645. 
45 See id. at 639 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27); infra notes 46–50 and accompanying 
text. 
46 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
47 Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 640; see also Robert L. Tsai, John Brown’s Constitution, 51 B.C. L. 
Rev. 151, 161 (2010) (“Even a radical defender of gun possession such as John Brown en-
visioned that the [Second Amendment] privilege would not be unlimited.”). 
48 Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 640–41. 
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§ 922(g)(1).49 The court applied “longstanding” by reasoning that it 
would make no sense to strike down § 922(g)(9) merely because of its 
age.50 
 The Skoien II panel next addressed the appropriate standard of 
scrutiny for Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(9), adopted 
intermediate scrutiny,51 and devoted the rest of its opinion to demon-
strating that § 922(g)(9) is substantially related to an important gov-
ernment objective.52 The Seventh Circuit in 2011 reaffirmed the Skoien 
II court’s approach in United States v. Donovan.53 
II. Understanding the Heller Dicta 
 Thus far, this Comment has established that lower courts rely on 
the Heller Court’s “presumptively lawful” dicta in disposing of Second 
Amendment challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), and has described 
three approaches courts have taken when applying the dicta.54 Nearly 
every court to consider a challenge to § 922(g)(9) focuses on two 
phrases from the Heller Court’s dicta: longstanding and presumptively 
lawful.55 This Part examines how each approach interprets these two 
aspects of the Heller dicta.56 
                                                                                                                      
49 Id.; see supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
50 614 F.3d at 640–41. The Skoien II en banc majority’s exact language reads “It would 
be weird to say that § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional in 2010 but will become constitutional 
by 2043, when it will be as ‘longstanding’ as § 922(g)(1) was when the Court decided Hel-
ler.” Id. at 641. 
51 Id. at 641–42. The court briefly analogized to First Amendment jurisprudence, but ul-
timately adopted intermediate scrutiny because the government conceded that some form of 
strong showing should apply: “The United States concedes that some form of strong showing 
(‘intermediate scrutiny,’ many opinions say) is essential, and that § 922(g)(9) is valid only if 
substantially related to an important governmental objective. The concession is prudent, and 
we need not get more deeply into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire . . . .” Id. (internal cita-
tions omitted). 
52 Id. at 641–45. 
53 See United States v. Donovan, No. 09-2346, 2011 WL 549676, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 16, 
2011). 
54 See supra notes 12–53 and accompanying text. 
55 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 627 n.26 (2008). Compare, 
e.g., United States v. Skoien (Skoien II ), 614 F.3d 638, 640–41 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(applying a unique approach), with United States v. Skoien (Skoien I ), 587 F.3d 803, 810 
(7th Cir. 2009) (applying the independent justification approach), with United States v. 
Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008) (applying the analogy approach). 
56 See infra notes 57–86 and accompanying text. 
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A. Longstanding 
 The Heller Court called 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) longstanding, but 
did not explain what makes a law longstanding.57 The Skoien II en banc 
majority suggested that longstanding could refer either to the statute’s 
age or to the history of federal firearms bans.58 
1. Longstanding as Applied to the Challenged Statute’s Age 
 First, the Skoien II en banc majority applied longstanding to com-
pare the age of the felon ban and § 922(g)(9).59 The Federal Firearms 
Act (the first federal gun ban and precursor to § 922(g)(1)) was enacted 
in 1938;60 § 922(g)(9) was enacted in 1996.61 The majority refused to 
hold § 922(g)(9) unconstitutional merely because it is younger than the 
felon ban, noting that it would be “weird” to invalidate § 922(g)(9) 
based solely on its age.62 
 Many courts employing the analogy approach uphold § 922(g)(9) 
as longstanding without inquiring into the law’s age.63 For example, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, in United States v. Booker, 
concluded that § 922(g)(9) was a longstanding prohibition because of 
its similarity to the felon ban, but did not discuss the relative ages of the 
bans.64 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that § 922(g)(9) was passed 
“relatively recently,” but nonetheless held that the law is a presump-
tively lawful longstanding prohibition because longstanding laws did 
not treat domestic violence.65 
 Courts using the independent justification approach also have not 
inquired into the felon ban’s age.66 This is likely the case, however, be-
cause both the Seventh Circuit Skoien I panel and the Fourth Circuit in 
United States v. Chester remanded for creation of a record and did not 
reach a substantive Second Amendment analysis.67 
                                                                                                                      
57 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 627 n.26. 
58 See Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 640–41. 
59 See id. 
60 Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938) (repealed 1968); 
Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 640. 
61 See Lautenberg Amendment, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-371 to 
-372 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–922, 925 (2006)). 
62 See Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 641. 
63 See, e.g., Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 163–65. 
64 See id. 
65 United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010). 
66 See Skoien I, 587 F.3d at 810. See generally United States v. Chester (Chester I ), 367 F. 
App’x 392 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
67 See Skoien I, 587 F.3d at 815; Chester I, 367 F. App’x at 398–99. 
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2. Longstanding as Applied to the Challenged Statute’s History 
 The en banc majority in Skoien II also applied longstanding to refer 
to the felon ban’s history.68 The court concluded that historical evi-
dence supports categorical prohibitions on gun ownership such as the 
felon ban based on two historical sources: founding-era state constitu-
tions and a report of the Pennsylvania delegation to the Constitutional 
Convention.69 The majority reasoned that, because these founding-era 
documents prohibited convicts and some other categories of persons 
from owning guns, categorical prohibitions on gun ownership such as 
the felon ban should be allowed today.70 
 Courts employing the analogy approach have not inquired into 
the history of firearms regulations in America.71 They rely solely on the 
Heller Court’s decree that the felon ban is presumptively lawful and do 
not inquire into § 922(g)(9)’s history.72 
 Two judicial opinions employing the independent justification ap-
proach and numerous scholars have concluded that historical evidence 
might not support categorical prohibitions on gun ownership such as 
the felon ban.73 These judges and scholars question whether gun con-
trol laws in effect when the Second Amendment was ratified prohibited 
convicts from owning guns.74 The first federal gun ban, the Federal 
Firearms Act, was not enacted until 1938 and prohibited only violent 
                                                                                                                      
68 See Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 640–41. 
69 Id. at 640 (citing 2 Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary 
History 662, 665 (1971)). 
70 Id. The majority noted that both the state constitutions and the report allowed citi-
zens to own guns but did not extend the right to convicts. Id. 
71 See, e.g., Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 163–65 (not exploring § 922(g)(1)’s history). 
72 See, e.g., White, 593 F.3d at 1205–06 (reasoning that § 922(g)(9) should be included 
in the list of longstanding prohibitions because of the history of the problem of domestic 
violence rather than the history of the law). 
73 See Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 650 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (citing Don B. Kates & Clayton E. 
Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 Hastings L.J. 1339, 
1359–64 (2009); C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 695, 714–28 (2009)) (concluding that the historical evidence concerning fire-
arms bans is inconclusive); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1049 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(Tymkovich, J., concurring) (suggesting an independent justification approach); Nelson 
Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1343, 1357 
(2009) (noting an “absence of historical support” for categorical bans); Marshall, supra, at 
708 (“[O]ne can with a good degree of confidence say that bans on convicts possessing fire-
arms were unknown before World War I.”); Winkler, supra note 17, at 1563 (noting that the 
Founders did not impose gun control laws on people convicted of crimes). 
74 See Lund, supra note 73, at 1357; Marshall, supra note 73, at 707–13; Winkler, supra 
note 17, at 1563. 
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felons from owning guns;75 this ban was only extended to encompass 
nonviolent felons in 1968.76 Therefore, the felon ban prohibits persons 
convicted of “trivial” felonies such as tax evasion and antitrust violations 
from owning guns.77 Independent justification opinions conclude that 
this historical evidence is inconclusive regarding whether the Second 
Amendment supports categorical bans;78 some scholars go further and 
argue that the felon ban is facially invalid insofar as it prohibits nonvio-
lent felons from owning guns.79 
B. “Presumptively Lawful” 
 Heller stated that the felon ban is presumptively lawful, but did not 
explain what it meant by “presumptively.”80 The Skoien en banc majority 
interpreted that language to create a rebuttable presumption in favor 
of the regulation.81 The Seventh Circuit recently explained that, be-
cause Heller called the felon ban presumptively lawful, that provision 
could be vulnerable to an as-applied challenge and the court must in-
quire into the law’s constitutionality.82 In other words, if a challenged 
law is presumptively lawful by analogy to the Heller dicta, the law enjoys 
a presumption of constitutionality but must still be subjected to some 
level of scrutiny.83 
 Courts using the analogy approach do not inquire into the mean-
ing of presumptively lawful.84 After determining that § 922(g)(9) is sim-
ilar enough to the felon ban to be presumptively lawful, these courts 
end their inquiry.85 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Federal Firearms Act, §§ 1(6), 2(f), Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250, 1250 
(1938) (repealed 1968). Unlike the current felon ban, the Federal Firearms Act disquali-
fied only those convicted of a “crime of violence,” which was defined as “murder, man-
slaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnaping [sic], burglary, housebreaking; assault with intent to 
kill, commit rape, or rob; assault with a dangerous weapon, or assault with intent to com-
mit any offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” Id. 
76 Lund, supra note 73, at 1357. 
77 Kates & Cramer, supra note 73, at 1362. 
78 Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 650–51 (Sykes, J., dissenting); McCane, 573 F.3d at 1048. 
79 Kates & Cramer, supra note 73, at 1363 (opining that federal statutes regulating gun 
possession appear to be invalid insofar as they seek to bar arms possession by those con-
victed of “trivial” felonies). 
80 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 
81 See Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 640–42 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is presumptively 
lawful, then applying a standard of scrutiny to the provision). 
82 United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010). 
83 See id.; accord Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 641–42. 
84 See. e.g., Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 163–64 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is pre-
sumptively lawful, but failing to test the presumption). 
85 See id. (holding that § 922(g)(9) is presumptively lawful after examining Heller). 
2011 Skoien and Heller’s “Presumptively Lawful” Dicta 93 
 Courts using the independent justification approach acknowledge 
that the regulations listed in the Heller dicta are presumptively lawful, 
but refuse to extend Heller’s presumptively lawful language to other, 
non-enumerated provisions such as § 922(g)(9).86 
III. Are Lower Courts Faithfully Applying the Heller Dicta? 
 The previous Part of this Comment discussed how three post-Heller 
Second Amendment approaches apply that decision’s “longstanding” 
and “presumptively lawful” dicta.87 This Part compares the three ap-
proaches, evaluates their faithfulness in applying the Heller dicta, and 
concludes that the Skoien II decision represents the soundest applica-
tion of the presumptively lawful dicta that any federal court of appeals 
has yet propounded.88 
 The analogy approach makes little attempt to wrestle with the 
longstanding or presumptively lawful language, and therefore repre-
sents an incomplete approach to applying Heller.89 For example, the 
Eleventh Circuit, in the 2010 case of United States v. White, acknowl-
edged that § 922(g)(9) might not be longstanding, but ultimately dis-
missed this observation by interpreting longstanding to refer to the is-
sue of domestic violence rather than § 922(g)(9), the law providing a 
remedy for that issue.90 Other analogy approach courts simply uphold 
§ 922(g)(9) without considering whether it is longstanding.91 Under 
the analogy approach, courts do not apply a legal presumption to the 
challenged regulation, or even inquire into what it means to be pre-
sumptively lawful; instead, they treat presumptively lawful regulations as 
immune to constitutional attack.92 
 The independent justification approach attempts to wrestle with 
the longstanding and presumptively lawful language, but evaluating 
                                                                                                                      
86 See United States v. Chester (Chester I ), 367 F. App’x 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam) (citing Skoien I, 587 F.3d at 808); Skoien I, 587 F.3d at 808. 
87 See supra notes 54–86 and accompanying text. 
88 See infra notes 89–106 and accompanying text. 
89 See. e.g., United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010). 
90 Id. at 1205–06 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is constitutional, though enacted 
recently, because “longstanding” laws were not solving the domestic violence problem). 
This interpretation, unlike the Heller Court’s, applies longstanding to the problem rather 
than the challenged regulation. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–
27, 627 n.26 (2008), with White, 593 F.3d at 1205–06. 
91 See In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Wyman, 
No. CR-08-154-B-W, 2009 WL 426293, at *1 (D. Me. Feb. 20, 2009); United States v. Li, No. 
08-CR-212, 2008 WL 4610318, at *4–5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2008); United States v. Booker, 
570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 162–64 (D. Me. 2008). 
92 See, e.g., White, 593 F.3d at 1205–06. 
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that approach is difficult because it has only rarely been applied to a 
factual record by a majority opinion.93 Independent justification opin-
ions interpret Heller’s longstanding language as applying to the felon 
ban’s history, and conclude that historical evidence is inconclusive re-
garding whether the original understanding of the Second Amend-
ment allowed categorical prohibitions on gun ownership.94 Unlike 
analogy approach courts, courts employing the independent justifica-
tion approach reject the idea that it is proper to uphold a law merely 
because it resembles a presumptively lawful law.95 
  The en banc majority in Skoien II did not faithfully apply Heller’s 
longstanding language as applied to the felon ban’s age.96 The court 
acknowledged that Heller called the felon ban longstanding, but refused 
to hold § 922(g)(9) unconstitutional merely because of its age.97 This 
approach essentially reads longstanding out of Heller by acknowledging 
longstanding as a criterion but making no attempt to apply that crite-
rion to § 922(g)(9).98 
 The Skoien II decision also did not faithfully apply Heller’s long-
standing language as applied to the felon ban’s history.99 The majority 
cited several sources to support the proposition that categorical bans 
should be allowed under the original meaning of the Second Amend-
ment, but its sources did not clearly support that proposition.100 At 
                                                                                                                      
 
93 United States v. Chester (Chester I ), 367 F. App’x 392, 398–99 (4th Cir. 2010) (per cu-
riam) (vacating and remanding for creation of a record); United States v. Skoien (Skoien I ), 
587 F.3d 803, 815 (same). In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Masciandaro applied 
an independent justification framework in evaluating a Second Amendment challenge to a 
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior; the regulation prohibits carrying or 
possessing a loaded weapon in a motor vehicle in a national park. See No. 09-4839, 2011 WL 
1053618, at *1, *10–12 (11th Cir. Mar. 24, 2011) (inquiring as to whether the defendant’s 
claim implicated the Second Amendment, then determining the appropriate level of consti-
tutional scrutiny); see also 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) (2011). 
94 United States v. Skoien (Skoien II ), 614 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., 
dissenting); Skoien I, 587 F.3d at 810. 
95 See Chester I, 367 F. App’x at 397 (citing Skoien I, 587 F.3d at 808); Skoien I, 587 F.3d at 
808–09. 
96 See 614 F.3d at 641. 
97 See id. at 640–41 (“It would be weird to say that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is unconstitu-
tional in 2010 but will become constitutional by 2043, when it will be as ‘longstanding’ as 
[the felon ban] was when the Court decided Heller.”). 
98 See id. 
99 See id. at 640–42. 
100 See id. at 640. The court first cited a report written by the dissenting minority of the 
Pennsylvania Convention which asserted that criminals may be disarmed. See id. (citing 
Schwartz, supra note 69, at 665). This report, however, was a minority dissent, and did not 
make it into the Constitution. See id. But cf. Marshall, supra note 73, at 712–13. Second, the 
court cited a book, The Founders’ Second Amendment, which noted that it was “understood” that 
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best, they demonstrated conflicting historical evidence that is too in-
conclusive to support categorical bans.101 
                                                                                                                     
 The Skoien II en banc approach did, however, apply Heller’s pre-
sumptively lawful language faithfully.102 Heller did not hold that the 
listed regulations were immune to Second Amendment challenges, but 
said only that they would enjoy a presumption of validity.103 The en 
banc court applied intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(9) to test this pre-
sumption.104 In a later case, the Seventh Circuit confirmed that even if 
a defendant falls within a presumptively lawful categorical ban, that ban 
must still satisfy intermediate scrutiny.105 Applying intermediate scru-
tiny to the categorical bans properly reflects the Heller Court’s dicta and 
avoids the analogy approach’s pitfall of reading non-enumerated regu-
lations into the dicta.106 
Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court in Heller made clear that the Second Amend-
ment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, but left it to 
lower courts to determine how to apply that right. Given this lack of 
clear guidance, lower courts, including the Skoien II en banc majority, 
have turned to Heller’s list of presumptively lawful regulations for guid-
ance. Courts have taken three approaches to applying the Heller Court’s 
dicta: the analogy approach, the independent justification approach, 
and the Skoien II en banc majority’s hybrid approach. The Skoien II en 
banc majority approach is generally faithful to Heller’s dicta, and will 
likely serve as a model for other lower courts until the Supreme Court 
 
criminals would be excluded from the Second Amendment, but did so in a single sentence 
buried within a larger argument that the Second Amendment protects an individual rather 
than a militia right. See Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 640. But cf. Stephen P. Halbrook, The Foun-
ders’ Second Amendment 273 (2008). Third, the court cited C. Kevin Marshall’s article, 
Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, in upholding the felon ban, but the thrust of Mar-
shall’s argument is that no historical support exists for banning gun ownership by felons. See 
Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 640. But cf. Marshall, supra note 73, at 700–13. Fourth, the court cited 
Judge Timothy M. Tymkovich’s concurrence in United States v. McCane, which questions the 
validity of categorical prohibitions on gun ownership. See Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 640. But cf. 
United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047–50 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concur-
ring). 
101 See supra note 100. 
102 Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 627 n.26, with Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 641–42. 
103 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 
104 Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 641–45. 
105 Williams, 616 F.3d at 692. 
106 Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 627 n.26, with White, 593 F.3d at 1205–06, and 
Skoien II, 614 F.3d at 640–42. 
96 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 





Preferred citation: Frank Zonars, Comment, Shooting Heller in the Foot?: Applying and Misapplying 
District of Columbia v. Heller’s “Presumptively Lawful” Dicta in United States v. Skoien, 52 B.C. L. 
Rev. E. Supp. 83 (2011), http://www.bc.edu/bclr/esupp_2011/07_zonars.pdf. 
